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*008110826s1995    no            000 u eng
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*019  $bl
*020  $a8257090751
*035  $a(EXLNZ-47BIBSYS_NETWORK)999521198464702201
*035  $a(NO-LaBS)14097574(bibid)
*035  $a(NO-TrBIB)952119846
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*040  $aNO-OsNB$bnob$ekatreg
*1001 $aVislie, Jon$d1950-$0(NO-TrBIB)90230935$_31369000
*24510$aDesigning optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information$cby Jon Vislie
*260  $aOslo$bUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics$c1995
*300  $a20 s.
*4901 $aMemorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo$vno. 25, Aug. 1995
*533  $aElektronisk reproduksjon$b[Norge]$cNasjonalbiblioteket Digital$d2017-07-11
*588  $aKatalogisert etter omslag
*830 0$aMemorandum (Universitetet i Oslo. Sosialøkonomisk institutt : trykt utg.)$x0801-1117$vno. 25, Aug. 1995$w998120437074702201$_11432400
*85641$3Fulltekst$uhttps://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-nb_digibok_2017071109531$yNettbiblioteket$zDigital representasjon
*901  $a80
*999  $aoai:nb.bibsys.no:999521198464702202$b2021-11-14T20:32:28Z$z999521198464702202
^